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Abstract In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the consumer credit market in the UK has
witnessed a proliferation in the number of high-cost short-term credit (HCSTC) providers
promising easy access to credit without the complications of credit history. This act of
generosity came at a very high price, which on some occasions reached 4000% APR. After
refusing for many years to interfere with the credit price and other aspects of the HCSTC
business’ practices, the Government since 2014 started to impose certain regulatory restrictions
on the sector including a cost cap, January 2015, on what HCSTC providers can charge. This
article argues that the FCA’s credit cost cap and other regulatory measures taken since 2014
signify an important shift in the regulatory approach to HCSTC. It argues that the neoliberal
‘law and economics’ theoretical paradigm is no longer the foundation of the regulatory
framework. Instead, the Government has shifted towards a Polanyian ‘law and society’ based
approach, which is attentive to the vulnerability of HCSTC consumers and consequently more
capable of protecting them. This article concludes by arguing how this newly adopted
approach can be further advanced.
Keywords Vulnerable consumers . High-cost short-term credit . Credit consumer protection .
Neoliberalism . Embeddedness . Credit cost cap . ConsumerCredit Act 1974 . Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) . Financial Services Act 2012
The financial crisis of 2008 was a defining event of the first decade of the twenty-first century.
It brought significant changes to financial structures at both global and domestic levels and
triggered a chain of economic and social events such that its impacts are still unfolding.
In the UK, for example, the model of a sole financial regulator failed its most difficult test,
namely preventing the 2008 financial crash, and proved to be ineffective. As a result, the UK’s
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financial regulatory structure was redesigned and new regulatory bodies were introduced with
the intention of avoiding the mistakes of the past. This new regulatory structure is yet to be
tested. The UK financial market also witnessed certain unexpected episodes, for instance, the
disappearance of some of its main regional players, such as Northern Rock in the North East of
England that was fully nationalised and then sold to Virgin Money (Goff 2012), the partial
nationalisation of some of the major institutions in the banking market such as the Royal Bank
of Scotland and the break-up of some of the large banking institutions such as Lloyds TSB.
In addition to changing structures, more stringent banking requirements were introduced by
mainstream lenders before advancing credit to consumers, with the result that individuals’
access to conventional borrowing was restricted. This led, importantly, to a proliferation of a
particular type of high-cost credit, known as high-cost short-term credit (HCSTC), which
includes payday loans (FCA 2016b, c). The providers of this type of high-cost credit promise
easy access to credit without the complications of credit history; however, this comes at a cost.
HCSTC providers are notorious for their annual percentage rate (APR) which was, not so
long ago, soaring over 4000%. Although it does not include default charges, the APR
calculation factors certain variants into the total cost of credit including the interest rate and
other payable charges (The Consumer Credit (Total Charges for Credit) Regulations 2010 (SI
2010/1011), para 4 [5a] and para 6). While this phenomenon has not gone unnoticed by the
regulator, the regulatory response was delayed by the re-organisation of the financial regula-
tory authorities. As of 1st April 2014, one of the newly established financial regulators, the
Financial Conduct Authority, took over the responsibility for consumer credit regulation from
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). The FCAwas empowered by s.24 of the Financial Services
Act 2012 (substitutes sections 138-164 FSMA 2000 and inserts in the FSMA2000 s137C) to
make rules regarding the cost of credit and duration of credit agreements. Further, s.131 of the
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 amended section 137C of the Financial
Services Market Act 2000 placing a duty on the FCA to protect HCSTC consumers against
excessive charges, in other words, a duty to introduce a price cap.
In preparation for its new responsibility, the FCA in October 2013 issued a Consultation
Paper (CP) entitled BDetailed Proposal for the FCA Regime for Consumer Credit,^ in which
the FCA provided its vision for the governance of the HCSTC market. More importantly, this
CP represented a measured response to the key problems that were identified in the OFT’s
BPayday Lending Compliance Review: Final Report^ (2013), which included the use of
multiple loans roll over, irresponsible lending and the lack of affordability checks (OFT
2013). Some of the key measures proposed in the FCA’s October 2013 consultation included
capping debt roll over to two times, requiring risk warning on HCSTC financial promotions,
requiring HCSTC providers to provide information on free debt advice before the point of
rollover and capping the price of HCSTC. The first four measures were implemented on 1st
July 2014 (FCA 2014c), while the price cap was later subject to a separate consultation (FCA
2014b) and was implemented on 2nd January 2015 (FCA 2014a). In addition, since taking
over the regulation of consumer credit, the FCA has included specific binding rules in its
Consumer Credit Sourcebook, Chapter 5 (CONC 5), with regard to responsible lending, credit
worthiness and affordability assessment that apply to HCSTC (FCA 2016d).
The article is pursuing two main arguments. First, it argues that the recent regulatory
measures brought by the FCA to the HCSTC sector do not only represent a regulatory shift but
also an ideological one. The article demonstrates that for a long period of time, the legal and
regulatory approach to HCSTC was primarily influenced by a Blaw and economics^ paradigm
and its neoliberal underpinning. Accordingly, it is argued that this approach prevented the
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regulator from interfering to prevent the abusive practice of HCSTC providers, which ad-
versely affected a vulnerable segment of the society. The article contends that the recent
regulatory changes to the HCSTC market signify a clear departure from a Blaw and
economics^ based regulatory approach. It is, therefore, argued that there is a shift towards a
more Blaw and society^ based regulatory approach in which the interest of the society is not
subordinated to the economy. Central to article’s analysis of the Blaw and society,^ paradigm is
Polanyi’s concept of Bembeddedness^ that re-defines the relationship between the society and
the market, where the former is not treated as an Badjunct^ to the latter.
Second, the article argues that despite the significance of these new regulatory measures,
they are still unable to address all the challenges posed by the HCSTC phenomenon. The
article suggests that these newly brought regulatory measures are an essential part of the
infrastructure of an embedded HCSTRC market. However, there are other important measures
that the UK government needs to take in order to effectively move away from the influence of
neo-liberalism and further embed the HCSTC market in the society.
In order to achieve its objectives, the article in part I examines the origins of the UK high-
cost credit sector in general and the evolution of HCSTC as one of its main segments. This part
is essential to highlight the significant challenges that the HCSTC sector poses. In part II, the
article reviews the underpinning theoretical foundation of the legal and regulatory framework
that governs the HCSTC sector in order to demonstrate the ideological shift in the regulatory
approach. In part III, the article examines the steps that need to be taken by the government to
further embed the HCSTC in the society.
The Origins of the High-Cost Credit Sector in the UK and the Evolution
of High-Cost Short-Term Credit
Money has not always been an essential component of all individuals’ daily financial transactions.
Adam Smith argued that money gained its prominent position only when barter ceased to exist
(Smith 2008). Smith found that the Bmarket^ created the required environment in which commod-
ities are exchanged for money and then the same money is used to purchase other commodities.
Hence, the quantity of money received from the exchange decides the quantity of the other
commodities that can be purchased. Since then, accordingly, money became an essential instrument
to estimate the value of commodities offered on the market (Smith 2008). Further, an individual’s
revenue is estimated on the basis of the power of purchasing and consuming that is offered by the
quantity of money he or she receives on an annual basis (Smith 2008). This significant shift in the
eighteenth century made the cash nexus central to market activities. For many nineteenth century
classical political economy critics, the cash nexus itself represented the axiomatic characteristic of
modernmarket exchange (Finn 2003).More importantly, since money became an integrated part of
almost all transactions, a new market, namely consumer credit market, emerged to facilitate the
modern form ofmarket exchange. The consumer credit market is primarily used by individuals who
do not have the required quantity of money to purchase the needed quantity of goods.
Within this consumer credit market, there has always been the high-cost credit market,
which was mainly associated with a large segment of the working class in the UK. Historically,
this has always been a case due to a number of factors among which were a low and irregular
income combined with instability of employment (Johnson 1983; Tebbutt 1983). These
problems created a constant need among this social class to find alternative sources of credit
in order to make ends meet.
The UK New HCSTC Regulatory Framework
It is worth noting that the UK high-cost credit market has continuously evolved throughout
the centuries. The nineteenth century (1850–1900) witnessed the emergence of several modes
of high-cost credit—such as pawnbroking, mail order, hire purchase, credit drapers and check
traders—to satisfy the economic needs of an economically vulnerable segment of the society
(O’Connell and Reid 2005). Pawnbroking had particularly flourished during the nineteenth
century where the largest share of the high-cost credit market belonged to pawnbrokers, and
pawning accommodated the credit needs of the working class (Tebbutt 1983).
The twentieth century witnessed certain changes to the high-cost credit market with the
sharp decline in pawnbroking (Taylor 2002) and the gradual disappearance of credit traders
and check traders (O’Connell and Reid 2005). Moreover, some early forms of HCSTC started
to emerge with the rise of doorstep moneylenders such as Provident (O’Connell 2009). This
exposed this economically vulnerable segment of society to the increasing business of
moneylenders. Since then, the business models of moneylending evolved, but its exploitive
nature has never changed; whether in the form of a money shop or a doorstep lender, those
moneylenders have always been actively present in economically disadvantaged areas
(O’Connell 2009).1
In the twenty first century, a new breed of moneylenders has evolved and proliferated,
namely online HCSTC providers (the like of Wonga, Quick quid and Pound to pocket). They
maintained the promise of a quick and easy access to credit for consumers with a weak
bargaining position while charging them an astronomic interest rate.2
The development of these online HCSTC providers raises serious social and economic
concerns, which compound already existing concerns with HCSTC lending.
First, being accessible on smart phone apps or online widens HCSTC provides’ client base,
expanding especially among younger generations (i.e., computer savvy/smart phone genera-
tion). Therefore, the traditional stereotype of moneylenders’ clients as working class family
men/women is no longer a complete accurate reflection of reality. A report published by R3:
Association of Business Recovery Profession in 2013, for example, showed that the demand
for HCSTC among young adults—aged 18 and over—is Bworryingly high^ (R3: Association
of Business Recovery 2013). Moreover, a relatively recent survey in 2014 showed further that
a Bworrying^ number of undergraduate students use HCSTC lenders (BBC 2014). The danger
with attracting this group of borrowers is that their use of this type of credit is not always
associated with economic hardship and a need to cover the costs of necessities, but rather with
consumerism and conspicuous consumption.3 In this regard, a series of studies has demon-
strated that the increased propensity to use credit is primarily driven by individuals’ tendency
to express their identity through consumption and social comparison (Kamleitner et al. 2012).
The acquisition of credit in the twenty first century, therefore, can be a means to an end that is
the unaffordable goods, which are needed in order to establish social status among their peers
(Kamleitner et al. 2012). It has been suggested that in many cases, the increased use of credit is
1 For more recent examples, please see Bureau of Investigative Journalism https://www.thebureauinvestigates.
com/2014/03/12/uk-one-short-term-lender-for-every-seven-banks-on-the-high-street/.
2 Before the FCA price cap came into effect 2 January 2015, Wonga was charging 4214% Annual Percentage
Rate (APR) which meant 31.37% interest rate per month.
3 It is defined by Mason as a Bform of exceptional behaviour …. concerned primarily with the ostentatious
display of wealth. Motivated by a desire to impress others with the ability to pay particularly high prices for
prestige products, it is a form of consumption which is inspired by the social rather than the economic or
physiological utility of products^ see Mason, R. (1981). Conspicuous consumption: A study of exceptional
consumer behaviour. Aldershot, UK: Gower pp. vii-viii.
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socially motivated and that during a period of economic hardship and increased income
inequalities, such social pressure tends to increase (Kamleitner et al. 2012).
Second, and more importantly, the online nature of this type of high-cost credit providers
has dehumanised the lending transactions and removed a community link. The traditional
forms of HCSTC providers, such as money shops and doorstep lenders, have always depended
in their business on their agents who have their links and ties with the community among
which they operate. HCSTC providers (or their agents) showed, on a few occasions, genuine
acts of human compassion as they prevented a debtor from taking further credit knowing that
they would not be able to pay it back, or allowed a distressed debtor to miss a payment
(O’Connell and Reid 2005).4
The human interaction, consideration and community understanding aspect of lending are
currently missing from all online HCSTC lending transactions, which simply rely on an
algorithm, a software or a credit rating calculation to make an immediate lending decision.
The automated mechanical nature of these lending decisions, compounded by lax affordability
checks (OFT 2013)5 and the lack of reflection time for consumers due to the instantaneous
access to this type of credit, have significantly disadvantaged those consumers with, for one
reason or another, a weak bargaining position.
The important narrative that the above overview provides is that the substratum of HCSTC
business has not actually changed. Regardless of the form in which HCSTC providers are
reaching out to consumers, Bvulnerability^ of their consumers continues to be a defining
feature of their business.
The concept of vulnerability is of particular significance in the financial context. Although
being on low income is not Ba necessary condition of vulnerability,^ it is an essential cause
of it and when combined with other vulnerabilities—such as young age and naivety, lack of
literacy skills, life events or illness—those affected consumers become highly susceptible to
significant detriment (FCA 2015; FCA 2016a). In other words, vulnerable consumers are
those who are exposed to one or more of the above limiting factors, which undermine their
bargaining position and well-being (Smith and Cooper-Martin 1997).
Moreover, it has been suggested that the way in which modern markets operate adds further
to the vulnerability of consumers (FCA 2015). For instance, the new online platform, which
the new breed of HCSTC providers use, has not only provided them with wider potential
groups to prey on, but it also weakened consumers bargaining powers given the automated
nature of the process and the lack of any human interaction.
These changes in consumer base and methods of offering are alarming, and they require a
shift in the regulatory approach to this type of credit and its providers.
The Theoretical Makeup of High-Cost Short-Term Credit Legal
and Regulatory Framework
Uncovering the theoretical underpinning of the governing framework of the UK HCSTC
market not only helps understand its remits and shortfalls, but also helps identify ways to
4 O’Connell cites a different number of studies that show that money lenders and their agent were concerned with
establishing a trust and friendship relationship with their customers and refer to a number of occasions where this
was manifested in actions.
5 In the OFT final report (2013), there is evidence of the lack of sufficiency and rigour in assessing credit
worthiness and affordability by the majority of short-term lenders (p.12).
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promote and better develop this governing framework. In this respect, there are two distinctive
theoretical frameworks, namely Blaw and economics^ and Blaw and society,^6 that are of
significant relevance to HCSTC and should be examined in this context.
Reviewing HCSTC Governing Structure through the Lens of the BLaw
and Economics^ Framework
It can be argued that, until very recently, the legal and regulatory framework governing the
HCSTC sector has been primarily influenced by the Blaw and economics^ theoretical frame-
work. This means that the governance of the UK HCSTC sector has been predominantly
driven by neoliberal economic thought (Ramsay 2010; Ramsay and Williams 2009) 7 and
shaped by Hayek’s free market ideology and New Institutional Economics (Haldar 2014).8
Harvey (2005) defines neo-liberalism Bas a theory of political economic practices’ that
closely associates human wellbeing with the liberation of the ‘individual entrepreneurial
freedoms and skills^ (Harvey 2005, p. 2). This, accordingly, requires a set of preconditions
that are strong private property rights, free markets, free trade and a State that can preserve these
preconditions (Harvey 2005). Further, it has been suggested that one of the key characteristics
that distinguishes neoliberalism from the other liberal projects is its Bmarket centrism^ (Mudge
2008, p. 714). Neo-liberalism, therefore, severs the market’s links with other entities and
elevates the market above all. This form of the market as a self-dependent entity, according
to neo-liberalism, symbolises the source of human freedom (Mudge 2008).
The Bmarket centrism^ premise can be traced in the writing of one of the most eminent neo-
liberal thinkers, Friedrich von Hayek (Harvey 2005).
Hayek considers a free and competitive market a manifestation of a Bspontaneous order^
that is society and, more importantly, a major tool in creating such an order (Hayek 1988, pp.
6–7). Therefore, Hayek argues against any Binterference^ or Bintervention^ in the market in
the form of central collective commands that require specific actions (Hayek 1973, p. 51). This
is due to the fallibility of the premise of such mechanism, namely the ability of a central
authority to have the required knowledge and information of all the elements and their
changing factors in the market order (Hayek 1988, p. 7). Instead, Hayek favours a self-
regulating market, Bhighly complex self-maintaining orders^ (Hayek 1988, p. 9), in which
the elements of the order adjust in actions to new factors (Hayek 1973) primarily through the
mechanisms of competition and pricing (Hayek 1994).9 However, he found Ba dogmatic
laissez faire^ (Hayek 1994, p. 41) market to have tainted the liberal cause (Hayek 1994, p.
21). Hence, Hayek stresses the need for Brules^ of conduct that assist the formation of the
6 Both theoretical frameworks were originally examined by Haldar in the context of law and development.
Haldar, A. (2014). Law and development in crisis: An empirical challenge of the current theoretical frames.
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 65(3) 303–321.
7 Christopher Payne has examined the history of neo-liberalism and its influence on the politics of consumers and
credit in the UK, see Payne, C. (2012) The consumer, credit and neoliberalism: Governing the modern economy.
London: Routledge. Walker examined the links between increased personal debt and neo-liberal economic
policies in the UK see Walker, C. (2011). Personal debt, cognitive delinquency and techniques of
governmentality: Neoliberal constructions of financial inadequacy in the UK. Journal of Community & Applied
Social Psychology, 22, 533–538.
8 Considering that the focus of Haldar’s article was Blaw and development^ she includes the BRule of Law
Orthodoxy^ as well, see Golub, S. (2003). Beyond rule of law orthodoxy, the legal empowerment alternative.
Vol. 41. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
9 see also footnote n6 in Haldar 2014.
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Bself-organising structure^ of the market order (Hayek 1988, p. 37) and only guide the
interactions of individuals (Hayek 1973, p. 49). The free market as envisaged by Hayek is a
space in which individuals’ interaction is guided by a minimum set of rules, rather than
commands, that is offered by a Bfree society^ (Hayek 1978, p. 82) and creates conditions under
which individuals’ knowledge and initiative can be utilised (Hayek 1994, p.40). This suggests
that the market as an entity is separate from society and that these rules, which are offered by
social organisations, are extrinsic to the market and not social in nature (Haldar 2014).
Furthermore, in its quest to liberate Bindividual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills,^ neo-
liberalism brings focus to the institutional framework within which this aspired process of
liberation can be achieved (Harvey 2005, p. 2). It proposes that one of the essential charac-
teristics for this framework, in addition to free markets, is strong private property rights. It also
envisages a limited role for the State in order to maintain these preconditions, i.e., free markets
and private property rights (Harvey 2005). In this regard, the BNew Institutional Economics^
(NIE)10 has focused on further advancing the neo-liberal quests in this respect.
Out of the four levels of social analysis discussed by Williamson (2000),11 NIE only
advances the Binstitutional environment^ and the Binstitutions of governance^ (Williamson
2000, p. 598). The former concerns the protection of property rights due to their economic
significance, and the latter is mainly concerned with installing the required mechanisms that
are capable of protecting these property rights and settling any related disputes (Williamson
2000). In this regard, it has been suggested that Bone of the purposes of the legal system is to
establish that clear delimitation of rights on the basis of which the transfer and recombination
of rights can take place through the market^ (Coase 1959, p. 25).
Accordingly, government’s involvement in the market should be limited to introducing the
above mentioned legal framework and protecting its enforceability, while the market is left
with the task of re-assigning property rights according to the supply and demand mechanism
and pricing (Golub 2003).
Leading from the above discussion, it can be argued that—up until 2014 where the
regulator (FCA) started to interfere in the HCSTC market by imposing a set of protective
measures the latest of which came into effect in January 2015 by capping the HCSTC cost—a
close link could be established between certain aspects of the UK’s regulatory approach to the
HCSTC sector and some of the fundamental premises of the Blaw and economics^ theoretical
framework, to which we turn now.
The strong influence of neoliberal economic policies goes back to the late 1970s where the
consumer credit market in the UK, among other segments of the financial sector, witnessed
significant changes to its governance ethos. With regard to consumer credit, the Government
of the time established the Crowther Committee to review the governance of the consumer
credit sector. The report, which was published in 1971, showed clear signs of a neoliberal
approach to regulating consumer credit. It stated that Bthe right policy is not to restrict their
[consumers’] freedom of access [to credit] by administrative and legal measures but to help the
minority who innocently get into trouble to manage their financial affairs more successfully^
(Crowther Report 1971, para 3.9.2). It is the neoliberal assumption that consumer credit,
especially for those with low income, is beneficial as it helps fill the financial gaps between
10 For more detail on the evolution of NIE, see Richter, R. (2005). The new institutional economics: Its start, its
meaning, its prospects. European Business Organisation Law Review, 6 (2) 161–200.
11 Level 1: embeddedness, Level 2: institutional environment, level 3: governance of the game, Level 4: resource
allocation and employment, see Williamson, O. E. (2000). The new institutional economics: Talking stock,
looking ahead. Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3), 597.
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individuals’ income and expenses and also allows them to accumulate assets in the long run.
Trumbull (2014) describes this approach to consumer credit as a form of privatisation to the
welfare regime (Trumbull 2014).
More importantly, the report sets the tone for many years to come with regard to the level of
State intervention that is expected in the consumer credit market. It stated: Bour general view is that
the state should interfere as little as possible with the consumer’s freedom to use his knowledge of
consumer credit market to the best of his ability and according to his judgement of what constitutes
his best interest…., it remains a basic tenant of a free society that people themselves must be the
judge of what contributes to their material welfare^ (Crowther Report 1971, para 3.9.1). In practice,
it meant that the State should no longer be involved in how credit is allocated; it should be left to the
consumers on one side and to the credit providers on the other to handle this process. This maps
onto Hayek’s premise of self-regulatingmarket that is free from any central collective interventions
and predominantly relies on a pricing mechanism to maintain its order.
In response to these neoliberal propositions, the Consumer Credit Act (CCA) was first
introduced in 1974. It is important to note that the CCA 1974 applies to all types of consumer
credit including high-cost credit, in which HCSTC is one of its forms.
The Act, since its introduction, abandoned the statutory ceiling of interest 48%, which was
set by the Money Lenders Act 1900 that was later amended by the Money Lenders Act 1927,
and instead provided the court with discretionary power to intervene when the credit bargain is
Bextortionate^ (Consumer Credit Act 1974, s137–140). Advocates of this shift, for instance
Cayne and Trebilcock (1973), highlighted the danger of relying on an interest rate cap. They
argued that such a measure would result in a collective exit of lenders from the market and that
borrowers will have less access to credit, which would make them face serious Bexclusionary^
consequences (Cayne and Trebilcock 1973, p. 414). Cayne and Trebilcock (1973) further
suggested that such solution Bis not only naïve, it clouds the relevant issues by framing an
economic problem in moralistic terms^ (Cayne and Trebilcock 1973, p. 400).
It must be noted that the idea of a self-regulating consumer credit market in which the price
is only determined by the market forces continued until January 2015 to be an accurate
reflection of the HCSTC market in the UK. The HCSTC lenders in the UK market were
allowed to charge an extortionately high interest rate without being restricted by the regulator
at the time, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT).
To the contrary, the OFT in its 2010 BReview of High Cost Credit^ took the view that any
imposed price control would have adverse effects on consumers and the market despite many
consultation respondents requesting a cap on the price of credit (OFT 2010a, b). This was a
reflection of a long standing view of the Government of the time. The former Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) in its 2003 White Paper, BFair, Clear and Competitive: The Consumer
Credit Market in the 21st Century,^ expressed the Government’s concerns about the protection of
consumers on low incomes. However, the focus of the White Paper was not on the interest rates
charged under these credit agreements as the interest rate in general was not viewed as a source of
concern. Instead, the White Paper expressed concerns regarding other elements such as default
charges, level of security required and lack of transparent information (DTI 2003).
The justification provided by the industry, and clearly accepted by the Government, for
charging an extortionately high interest rate stemmed from the fundamental mechanism of
pricing. This is simply because the price that was decided by the market factored the higher
credit risk, which those lenders were exposed to when lending to less creditworthy consumers.
This allowed their APR to reach as much as 4000% where HCSTC providers enjoyed high
discretion in modelling credit risk and factoring it into their APR calculation.
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Additionally, with neoliberalism strongly advocating the protection of private property
rights, the influence of NIE can be seen with regard to the governance of the HCSTC market
in the UK. In this regard, with the absence of any regulatory restraints on the price of this type
of credit, disadvantaged consumers only had one legal means, the CCA 1974 (as amended by
CCA 2006), to fall back on.
As mentioned earlier, the CCA 1974, after scrapping the 48% statutory interest rate cap,
introduced the Bextortionate credit^ bargain test as a means to question the charged interest rate
among other elements of the agreement. It is a test that the Government later questioned its
effectiveness as a protection mechanism (DTI 2003, p. 52). Accordingly, the CCA1974 was
amended by the CCA 2006, which repealed ss137–140 of the CCA 1974 and the Bextortionate
credit^ bargain test, and introduced a new test, the Bunfair relationship^ test, under ss140A-
140C (CCA1974).
In assessing the fairness of the agreement, the new test applies to the main credit agreement
and any other related agreements12 covering the terms of these agreements, their enforcement
and actions and omissions by the creditor, or on their behalf, either before or after the making
of the credit agreement or any related agreement (CCA 1974, s 140A (1-a, 1-b)).
Since the CCA 2006 amendments came into effect, the courts, regardless of their
different place in the judicial hierarchy, have reviewed several credit agreements where
the fairness of these contracts was questioned due to the high interest rate charged.13 The
common theme of the courts’ decisions in these cases was the primary focus on the
market practice to decide whether the high interest rate would render the agreement
unfair. This can be seen in the High Court and the Court of Appeal decisions in Khodari
v Al Tamimi [2009] EWCA Civ 1109, Barons Finance Ltd. v Lara Basirat Abeni Olubisi
[2011] EWCA Civ 1461 and Robert Shaw v Nine Regions Limited [2009] EWHC 3514
(QB), and County Courts decisions in Nine Regions (t/a Logbook Loans) v Sadeer
Bromley County Court, Case No: 8QT25415 and Nine Regions (t/a Logbook Loans) v
Fateh Singh Leeds County Court, Claim No: 8QZ 16394.
This is not to say that the court does not acknowledge the link between unfairness and
extortionate interest rate, but rather to demonstrate the importance that court attaches to the
market practice when deciding on the fairness of the interest rate.
The relatively recent decision of the Supreme Court in Pelvin v Paragon Personal Finance
Ltd. and another [2014] 1W.L.R. 4222 has stressed this point by stating that Bthe view that a court
takes of the fairness or unfairness may legitimately be influenced by the standard of commercial
conduct^ (Pelvin v Paragon Personal Finance Ltd. and another 2014, p. 4230). However, the
Supreme Court has balanced the importance of Bthe standard of commercial conduct^ with the
court’s discretion in deciding the fairness of the agreement, which is Ba matter for the court, on
which it must make its own assessment.^ The court will have Ba wide range of considerations^
which includes Bthe characteristic of the borrowers…sophistication or vulnerabilities…the range
of choices available…^ (Pelvin v Paragon Personal Finance Ltd. and another 2014, p. 4231).
Therefore, it can be suggested that the way in which that the unfair relationship test was
applied by the court, up until Pelvin (2014), is highly influenced by the Bmarket centrism^
premise of the Blaw and economics^ theoretical frame, with its neoliberal bedrock.
12 Defined in Consumer Credit Act 1974, s140C (4-a, b, c) and s140C (7–8).
13 It is important to note that not all these cases concerned HCSTC agreements. For a detailed discussion of
following cited cases and their decisions please see Aldohni, AK. (2013) Loan sharks v. short-term lenders: How
do the law and regulators draw the line? Journal of Law and Society, 40(3), 436–441.
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Further, the influence of the Blaw and economics^ theoretical frame can be seen in other
aspects of the governance of the HCSTC market in the UK.
First, the governance of loans roll over in HCSTC, which is an area where the regulator
never interfered and left it for the contracting parties. This practice escalated charges, and as a
result, many HCSTC borrowers became debt trapped as their loans became unaffordable (OFT
2012). The OFT BPayday Lending Compliance Review: Final Report^ (2013) estimated that
50% of the sector’s revenue came from loans rolled over or refinanced. It was also reported
that HCSTC lenders often encouraged rolling over loans, and in some cases, it was found to be
a Bfeature^ of the loan (OFT 2013, p.14–15).
Second, the creditworthiness and affordability assessment was not subject to clear rules that
must be applied by the HCSTC lenders. The regulator at the time, the OFT, only provided
guidance on what constitutes irresponsible lending practices for the purpose of s25 (2B) of
CCA 1974. The lack of sufficiency and rigour in assessing creditworthiness and affordability
by the majority of HCSTC lenders was identified as one of the major problems in this market
(OFT 2013, p. 12).
The lack of regulatory intervention in this respect can be mapped onto the Blaw and
economics^ paradigm. More specifically, NIE aspires to limit the legal intervention in the
market only to the protection of property rights and the enforceability of the related agree-
ments. In other words, law only ensures the functioning of the market and its mechanisms
without being concerned with the social backdrop of that market.
Reviewing HCSTC Governing Structure through the Lens of the BLaw and Society^
Framework
The Blaw and society^ theoretical frame offers a unique take on the interaction between law
and economy as it reviews their relationship from a sociological perspective. Accordingly,
society does not only play an imperative role in shaping this relationship but also, to a certain
extent, takes precedence over law and economics. Further, subscribers to this theoretical frame
even aspire to develop a new field known as the Beconomic sociology of law,^ which is Ba
sociological analysis of the role of law in economic life^ (Swedberg 2003, p. 1).
As this article argues that the Blaw and economics^ theoretical frame is no longer the
appropriate foundation of HCSTC regulation in the UK, it is essential, therefore, to examine
the influence of the Blaw and society^ paradigm in this context.
In this regard, it can be suggested that the work of Max Weber (1864–1920) and,
more importantly, Karl Polanyi (1886–1964) represents the foundation of the Blaw and
society^ paradigm. This makes their work of significance to the argument concerning
the Blaw and society^ paradigm and its influence on HCSTC regulation in the UK.
Max Weber was one of the leading sociologists who brought sociology closer to
economics demonstrating the importance of understanding the economy and its functions
with society in mind. Talcott Parsons in his introduction of the 1947 translation of Weber’s
seminal work BEconomy and Society^ rightly highlighted that Weber himself Bemphatically^
stressed that his work is not in any sense Beconomic theory^ (Weber 1964, p. 31). Parson
articulately described Weber’s work as Brather an account of the social….structure of systems
of economic activity^ (Weber 1964, p. 31).
Therefore, by taking a sociological approach to analysing and understanding the
economy, Weber started in BEconomy and Society^ with defining some basic sociological
concepts before later on arguing their relevance to the structure of the economy
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(Swedberg 2000).14 Hence, a central theme to Weber’s argument was the link between
the economic sphere and the social sphere with a particular reference to the influence of
some of the latter’s organisations, such as religion, on the former (Barber 1995;
Swedberg 2000). Accordingly, this has an implication on the relationship between law
and economy. Law is not a means devised to guarantee only economic interests as
envisaged under the Blaw and economics^ paradigm. Rather, law is also a means to
protect a diverse range of social interests including positions of social pre-eminence
which may be Beconomically conditioned or economically relevant in the most diverse
ways, but which are neither economic in themselves not sought for predominantly
economic ends^ (Weber 1978, vol.1, p. 333).
Karl Polanyi’s work also argued in favour of analysing and understanding the economy
through the lens of society. In his seminal work BThe Great Transformation,^ Polanyi
introduced the concept of Bembeddedness^ which challenged the dominant conception of
the relationship between economy and society. Polanyi’s concept of Bembeddedness^ defies
the notion that the economy is autonomous and society and social relations are subordinated to
the economy (Polanyi 2001, pp. xxiii-xxiv). He argued that such conception would create an
economic system only controlled by the market and its self-regulating mechanisms. This
means Bno less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy
being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system^
(Polanyi 2001, p. 60). Accordingly, the danger of society being subordinated to the economy is
that the livelihood of individuals is only secured by economic institutions. This creates a
system that lacks Ba conscious intervention of human authority, state or government^ (Polanyi
1977, p. 47), and in which the only legal necessity is the protection of property and
enforcement of contracts (Polanyi 1977, pp. 47–48). In order to counter this danger, Polanyi
argued in BThe Great Transformation^ that the economy should be embedded in social
relations and society, where the economy and society should not be considered two separate
entities. Since then, the concept of Bembeddedness^ has found its way into the historical and
political writing on the notion of moral economy (Granovetter 1985, p. 482). Further, a
considerable body of literature has developed examining the meaning of Bembeddedness,^
its application and the forms in which it can be achieved (for instance, Block 2003; Cotterrell
2013; Dale 2010; Granovetter 1985; Perry-Kessaris 2011).
It can be suggested that the collective work of Polanyi took a diverse approach to
explaining the concept of the Bembeddedness^ of the economy.
On the one hand, in BThe Livelihood of Man,^ Polanyi provided an anthropological
perspective on the issue in order to prove that an embedded economy is not an alien concept.
He demonstrated that being embedded in social relations was, in tribal societies, the natural
status of any economic system and that from which economic institutions later evolved
(Polanyi 1977). This significant social dimension of an embedded economy, according to
Polanyi, sheltered economic interactions from Bthe corrosive effects of antagonistic emotions^
(Polanyi 1977, p. 56) associated with economic motives such as profit, gain and payment
(Polanyi 1977, p. 52). However, in order to optimise the identified advantages of an embedded
14 For instance Weber discussed the sociological concepts of Bcommunal relationship^ and Bassociative
relationship^ where the first one entails a form of belonging and the second purely based on interest, he argued
that most economic actions have a communal aspect to them which is rather important. See Swedberg, R. (2000).
Max Weber and the idea of economic sociology. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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economy, there is a need for Ban elaborate social organisation^ that can perform this task,
which was fulfilled in tribal societies by Bkinship^ (Polanyi 1977, p. 53, 55).
On the other hand, in BThe Great Transformation,^ Polanyi examined the need for the
concept of Bembeddedness,^ its applicability and the social organisations necessary for an
optimised embedded economy. In this regard, his argument was highly attentive to the social
and economic changes brought by the Industrial Revolution towards the end of the eighteenth
century and the early nineteenth century. BThe Great Transformation^ depicted a clear picture
of the changes to the economic sphere in which a self-regulating market, supported by the
political powers at the time, became the organising power of the economy. Consequently, the
evolution of Bmarket economy^ was a landmark shift that had far-reaching effects, which went
beyond the economic sphere into the social fabric of the society.
Polanyi argued that the new economic order commodified all elements of industry, namely
labour, land and money, which did not have the features of true commodities. Neither one of
these three elements was produced for sale. While money is a Btoken of purchasing power^
(Polanyi 2001, p. 75), labour and land, respectively, are Bno other than the human beings
themselves of which every society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists^
(Polanyi 2001, p. 75). Subsequently, the creation of these Bfictitious commodities^ (land,
labour and money) subjected them to the market’s supply—and—demand and price mecha-
nisms, which are known as the Bmarket laws.^ This was found by Polanyi to have socially
damaging effects since a self-regulating market, governed only by the Bmarket laws,^ first,
subordinated the substance of society, that is labour and land, to the economy through turning
them into Bfictitious commodities^ traded on the market (Polanyi 2001, p. 75). Second, it
inherently required the creation of separate economic institutions (i.e., disembedding the
economy from the society), which were driven by a distinctive economic motive namely gain
and profit (Polanyi 2001, p. 74). Therefore, Polanyi warned of the Bdemolition of society^ if
Bhuman beings^ (labour), Bnatural environment^ (land) and Bpurchasing power^ (money)
were to be solely directed by the market laws (Polanyi 2001, p. 76).
Although Polanyi’s use of the term Bdemolition of society^ could be described as an
exaggeration, this is not to stay that the creation of these fictitious commodities, in particular
land and money, and subjecting them merely to the market laws have not had any adverse
effects on the well-being of societies. Take for example the 2008 global financial crisis and
more specifically the collapse of Northern Rock. It has been argued that the bank’s risky
mortgage lending policy was part of a wider market practice in which providers needed to
respond to a sharp increase in demand in the property market. This demand was not always
created out of necessity, rather it was largely driven by the commodification of real properties
with the number of buy-to-let mortgages soaring in the run up to the 2008 financial crash
(Aldohni 2011).
Another, and more relevant, example is the commodification of money and its role in
fuelling the 2008 financial crash. For Polanyi, changing the nature of money from a Btoken
of purchasing power^ to a product for sale ought to have a damaging effect on societies.
This is a standpoint that has proved its accuracy particularly in the last few years. For
instance, the 2008 financial crisis that brought austerity and financial hardship to a large
segment of the society was fuelled by the use of debt as a tradeable commodity in
complicated financial products. Further, since 2008, banks have become more stringent
with their lending policies, which created a gap in the credit market that has been since
filled by HCSTC providers. The proliferation of HCSTC providers is a by-product of the
2008 financial crash who since have gained a significant presence online and on high
Aldohni A.K.
streets. Data collected by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism in March 2014 showed
that there were 1427 HCSTC lender shops in England, Scotland and Wales with high
concentration in impoverished areas (Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2014). Those
lenders have clearly benefited from the commodification of money and have significantly
profited from subjecting their Bfictitious^ product to the market laws only. This has allowed
them, up until January 2015, to charge an extortionate interest rate without any regulatory
objection considering that this was the market price of their product, which the market
produced through the mechanism of supply and demand.
The main problem with subjecting the price of HCSTC only to the supply and demand
mechanism is that it fails to take into any consideration the social context of the HCSTC
market. As demonstrated earlier in this article, throughout the history, consumers of HCSTC
have always been the most vulnerable in society with a weak bargaining position. It was
estimated that the average HCSTC customer has a lower income level than the UK population
as a whole—the average annual income in the UK is £26 500 (Office of National Statics
figures cited in Maguire 2014), for instance, 32% earn less than £12 000 per annum and 60%
earn less than £18 000 per annum (FCA November 2014).
This outcome would not have been accepted by the regulator had it not adopted a regulatory
approach that was primarily influenced by the Blaw and economics^ theoretical frame.
It is, therefore, argued that the solution to this problem lies with having an embedded
HCSTC market. This means a credit market in which the society can benefit from the
presumed state authority, through the introduction of socially concerned regulations that
control individuals’ greed and limit their pursuit of gain (Watson 2005; Dale 2010). Accord-
ingly, the criteria of such market primarily include, first, regulatory appreciation of the societal
dimension of the HCSTC market. Second, and more importantly, a state role that goes beyond
only protecting economic interests to include a diverse range of social interests. In other words,
all markets require ground rules; however, what makes a market embedded is the focus of
these rules. In an embedded HCSTC market, rules ensure that money as a fictitious commodity
is not only governed by the market forces but also governed by societal needs, and that private
property rights are protected without undermining the wider social interests.
In this regard, the rest of the discussion in this Part will collectively make two main
arguments. First, it will be suggested that the recent changes introduced by the Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA) to the HCSTC regulatory framework signify a departure from
some of the fundamental premises of the Blaw and economics^ theoretical frame. It is the
type of change that Peter Hall describes as a Bthird order change^ (Hall 1993, p. 279).
According to Hall (1993), this type of change is always associated with radical changes to
the continuous patterns of the policy in question. In the context of HCSTC, the introduc-
tion of a number of regulatory protective measures and capping the cost of credit by the
FCA are a discontinuation of the main pattern of the Blaw and economics^ paradigm
namely self-regulation and market laws. While discussing the characteristics of a Bthird
order change,^ Hall explains that such a change Bis likely to be more sociological than
scientific,^ in other words, Bmore political in tune^ (Hall 1993, pp. 280, 288). As expert
opinions may conflict, politicians will have to decide to which they should attach the
greatest authority (Hall 1993). This can be seen in the process that led to the Government’s
decision to make its radical shift in its regulatory approach to the HCSTC market. There
are a number of examples that demonstrate this shift. For instance, the original stance of
the Government was that capping the cost was not needed and, moreover, was not
desirable. However, with a growing political and media pressure, the Government made
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its U-turn (BBC 2013; Watt and Wintour 2012). In Hall’s words, Bpolicy changed, not as a
result of autonomous action by the state, but in response to an evolving societal debate that
soon became bound up with electoral competition^ (Hall 1993, p. 288).
Second, it will also be argued that this Bthird order change^ maps onto a Polanyian based
Blaw and society^ theoretical framework in which the concept of embeddedness has a central
role to play.
A BThird Order Change^ to the Regulatory Approach to HCSTC Market
It has been suggested that Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness encompasses the political and
social goal of ensuring that fictitious commodities are regulated in order to secure a stable
democratic society (Beckert 2009; Dale 2010). In part, this can be achieved through the
process of shaping economic behaviour by law making governmental interventions (Block
2003; Watson 2005). In other words, taking legal and regulatory steps that go beyond only
facilitating economic functions within the market.
It can be argued, therefore, that since the FCA has taken over as the regulator of consumer
credit, in April 2014, a host of measures were implemented to affect this shift.
First, in July 2014, the FCA capped the debt roll overs to two times to protect HCSTC from
falling into a debt spiral (FCA 2014c). It is the type of intervention that is not primarily
concerned with the functioning of the market rather with its social backdrop. As argued earlier
in Part I, vulnerability has always been a feature of high-cost credit consumers and more
specifically HCSTC consumers. Therefore, this regulatory intervention is an important step to
embed the HCSTC market, as it is concerned with the protection of the social aspect of the
market for a change.
Second, the OFT report found that the majority of HCSTC providers failed to properly
comply with the requirement to carry out a rigorous affordability and creditworthiness
assessment (OFT 2013). Therefore, in order to ensure the enforceability of this requirement,
the FCA made it part of its binding rules in the FCA’s Handbook. CONC 5.2.1R (1) states that
the firm must undertake the creditworthiness assessment before entering into a credit agree-
ment. More importantly, the HCSTC providers are required by the FCA rules to consider the
adverse impact that the agreement will have on the customer’s financial position (CONC
5.2.1R (2-a)). Further, the FCA also introduced other rules to safeguard the effectiveness of the
creditworthiness assessment. On the one hand, HCSTC providers Bmust establish and imple-
ment clear and effective policies and procedures to make reasonable creditworthiness
assessment^ (CONC 5.3.2R). On the other hand, it is the HCSTC provider’s duty to ensure
the truthfulness of the information provided by the customer for the purpose of the
creditworthiness/affordability assessment. The firm will be in breach of this rule if the firm
Bknows or ought reasonably to suspect that the customer has not been truthful^ (CONC
5.3.7R).
Finally, the price cap introduced by the FCA is a significant shift from the Blaw and
economics^ theoretical framework and a step closer towards embedding the HCSTC market in
society. This is because, as identified earlier, one of the criteria of an embedded HCSTC
market is a state involvement that understands the importance of protecting the economic
interests in the market; yet, it is designed to protect the wider societal interests beyond the
market.
The FCA has introduced a three layers cap, which came into effect on the 2nd January 2015
and is designed to deal with three main sources of concern in the HCSTC market, namely,
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interest, fees and default charges (FCA 2014a). The first layer, the initial price cap, covers
interest rates and fees as HCSTC providers cannot now charge more in interest and fees than
0.8% per day of the amount borrowed (FCA 2014a). The second layer targets default charges
as it restricts the amount paid in default to a total of £15 whether the debt is being repaid in
instalments or in a single payment. This means that HCSTC providers cannot charge £15 for
each instance of default when borrowers are paying back by instalments, and in any case, the
cumulative total default charges should not exceed £15 (FCA 2014a). The third layer is a total
cost cap where a borrower should never pay more in interest, fees and charges than 100% of
the amount borrowed.
Leading from that, there are a number of observations that can be made with regard to the
FCA’s price cap and its link to the highlighted criteria of an embedded HCSTC.
First, in setting up the price cap, the FCA has shown a genuine concern about the non-
economic well-being of the borrowers, demonstrating that there is a larger social goal to
the policy. Throughout the price cap implementation document, the FCA emphasised that
although losing access to HCSTC as a result of the price cap would have both negative and
positive effects, the latter would outweigh the former. In making its case, the FCA not only
relied upon economic analysis, which showed that, in the past, using HCSTC worsened the
financial position of those borrowers who would lose their access to this type of credit
after imposing the price cap, the FCA also referred to other positive welfare consequences
for borrowers that the loss of access to HCSTC would cause, such as the reduction of
stress, psychological and mental problems associated with over indebtedness (FCA
2014a).
Second, it is clear that the FCA’s price cap represents a governmental intervention aiming at
shaping the financial behaviour of HCSTC providers in a way that achieves a more stable
society. In particular, imposing the first layer of the price cap, the initial cost cap, deprives
HCSTC lenders of the financial benefits of lending to those who will not be able to pay back
their debt. For long time, HCSTC providers pursued a strategy to lend borrowers who are
incapable of paying back their debt so they can roll over the debt as many times as possible
continuing to charge an extortionate interest rate and fees before eventually charging extor-
tionate default charges. However, they can only roll over the debt for two times and the
maximum rate that they can now charge in interest and fees is limited to 0.8% per day. By
setting up the rate at 0.8%, the FCA aims to Bchange the underlying commercial incentives to
lend to the riskiest borrowers^ (FCA 2014a, p. 34).
However, it must be noted that Polanyi’s embeddedness concept does not advocate an
unrestrained form of governmental interventions. This can be clearly seen in Polanyi’s sharp
criticism of a particular regulation, Speenhamland law, which primarily concerned one of the
fictitious commodities, namely labour. Speenhamland law concerned the well-being of labour
during a period of financial hardship. It created an allowance system for labour, mainly in the
countryside, which meant that a relief or subsidy was paid in aid of certain low wages in
accordance to an adopted scale in which the price of bread was the benchmark. This law had
backfired as it dis-incentivised labourers to satisfy their employer since they were guaranteed a
particular income whatever wages they earn. Consequently, labourers’ productivity plummeted
and employers found an excuse to keep wages at low levels (Polanyi 2001).
In this regard, it can be suggested that the FCA was careful of the difficult balance that
embedding HCSTC market requires. The FCA’s price cap can be described as a measured
intervention that is not supposed to undermine the HCSTC market in the long run by
disproportionally favouring borrowers. This is a point that the FCA highlighted regularly in
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its price cap implementation document especially in the context of default charges. Although
many respondents to the original consultation on the price cap (FCA 2014b) criticised the
proposed fixed £15 cumulative default charges for being an inflated and an unreasonable
estimate of the true cost of default, the FCA maintained its cap on default charges at £15 (FCA
2014a). Further, the FCA has not, at least for now, requested HCSTC lenders to freeze interest
charged in default subject to the 0.8% cap per day. It is important to note that this was balanced
out by a rule included in the FCA’s Consumer Credit Sourcebook, Chapter 7 (CONC 7.3.4R),
which requires lenders to Btreat customers in default or in arrears difficulties with forbearance
and due consideration^ (FCA 2014a).
It is clear that the FCA is not taking a powerful paternalistic approach with regard to its
price cap in general and default charges more specifically. For instance, defaulting on a loan of
£150 means that borrowers can end up paying up to 10% of the total amount in default charges
alone, which is still considerably high bearing in mind the social backdrop of this type of
credit. However, this is necessary to incentivise borrowers to pay their debt on time.
Diminishing default charges in the case of HCSTC would not only have economic adverse
effects on lenders but would also reduce the sense of responsibility of borrowers.
It is worth noting that at the time of writing this article, the FCA is reviewing the price cap
to assess if there is evidence-based reason to change the price cap. The FCA also aims to find
out whether the cap has led to an increase in the use of illegal lending by those who were
excluded from the use of HCSTC as a result of the price cap (FCA 2016b, c).
Towards a More Embedded High-Cost Short-Term Credit Market
Given that it is essential to the embeddedness of the HCSTC market to take into account the
societal dimension of this market, this section argues that there are a number of ways in which
this could be achieved, including utilising the other social institutions in this market and
promoting the presence of social credit.
The Utilisation of Other Social Institutions
As argued earlier, the price cap and the other regulatory interventions represent an essential
part of the required infrastructure of embeddedness in the context of HCSTC. However, there
are other social institutions that can be utilised to complement this infrastructure. One of these
key social institutions is the knowledge and information institution (Barber 1995). The
borrowers’ level of knowledge and understanding of information plays a significant role in
the process of valuation, which is largely social in character (Beckert 2009) and essential to
their decision making.
It must be noted that this is quite different from information transparency advocated by the
Blaw and economics^ theoretical framework and long adopted by the regulator in the UK (DTI
2003). Transparency and disclosure measures in the context of HCSTC presume that bor-
rowers are empowered if they are told, for example, the interest rate and amount of money they
are or will be paying in interest. However, these measures have proved ineffective in protecting
HCSTC consumers because being told that you will pay an extortionate interest rate does not
protect you from becoming over indebted, whether the borrowing is driven by a life necessity
or by only conspicuous consumption. Therefore, sole reliance upon these measures has been
finally rejected by the FCA (FCA 2013).
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The FCA touched on the issue of consumer knowledge and education in its CP13/10
BDetailed Proposal for the FCA Regime for Consumer Credit.^ While highlighting some of
the proposed rules for HCSTC, the FCA referred to some Bconsumer education measures^
(FCA 2013, p. 75). In this context, the FCA stated that these measures Bwill empower
consumers at key decision points with information that could lead to them taking decisions
that lead to better outcomes^ (FCA 2013, p. 75). In principle, Bconsumer education^ in the
context of HCSTC is a wide-ranging concept that encompasses a selection of powerful tools,
which help shape economic behaviour from a consumer’s perspective. Among which there are
enhancing consumer’s financial literacy and also providing better information provisions as
both significantly improve the valuation process upon which consumers make their decisions.
This section will not examine the role of financial literacy rather it brings focus to information
provisions highlighting where the regulator is failing to utilise this means, which could be
particularly useful to protect the new client base (those who are young, financially naïve and
driven by consumerism) of online HCSTC providers.
In its CP13/10 BDetailed Proposal for the FCA Regime for Consumer Credit,^ the FCA
prioritised some specific provisions of information namely, debt warning and information on
debt advice. It proposed that HCSTC providers should include a debt warning in any electronic
communications (websites…etc.) and in their adverts. It also proposed that they need to
provide information on free debt advice before the point of roll over. While in principle, these
proposals are essential to further improve the valuation process of consumers, there are some
critical observations that can be made in this respect.
One the one hand, in the initial consultation document in October 2013, the FCA proposed
the following warning:
BThink! Is this loan right for you? Over 2 million short-term loans were not paid off on
time in 2011/2012. This can lead to serious money problems. If you’re struggling, go to
www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk for free and impartial help.^ (FCA 2013, p. 69).
The warning in its proposed form was designed to specifically address HCSTC and capture
the attention of its online borrowers. The aim of the proposed warning to get potential
borrowers to question their actual need to use this type of credit. It then provides a loss framed
warning as it presents specific evidence on the danger of using HCSTC. Finally, it points them
towards a source—the Money Advice Service—where they can discover other funding
alternatives to HCSTC.
Unfortunately, the warning was not implemented in the same terms as the FCA’s initial
proposal. In particular, the implemented warning does not have the first two salient features of
the proposed warning. It simply states
BWarning: Late repayment can cause you serious money problems. For help, go to
moneyadviceservice.org.uk^ (FCA 2014c, p. 55).
Accordingly, it would not trigger consumers to question their need to use this type of credit,
a point that could have a significant effect on online borrowers with consumeristic motives.
Moreover, instead of highlighting some hard evidence on the risks of using HCSTC, it
provides no more than a generic statement that can apply to all types of credit.
This is particularly dangerous for a number of reasons. First, using this general term Blate
payment^ would not necessary make consumers think about this danger in the context of
HCSTC considering that their judgement can be clouded by self-serving interpretation and a
sense of false optimism on their ability to make payments (Howells 2005).
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Second, and more importantly, the warning no longer has a loss framed format, which
research showed is an effective way to capture consumers’ attention and get them to think
about the risks associated with their actions.15
In other words, although both statements, one way or another, deliver the same message,
using loss framed format, such as including some facts about the rate of default in HCSTC or
even the damages associated with it, would improve the cognitive responses of consumers.
Finally, the FCA failed to look into how the warning should be displayed by the HCSTC
providers. This is a rather critical issue as it influences the effects that any warning might have.
The extensive research that has been done in relation to warnings on cigarette packs proved the
significance of this issue. The key finding of the collective research on the display of cigarette
packet warnings is the superior impact that graphic and large text warnings have with regard to
better communicating smoking risks, convincing smokers of the reality of these risks and,
arguably, leading to cessation behaviour (Borland et al. 2009; Emery et al. 2014; Travers et al.
2011). While the use of graphic warning is less possible in the context of HCSTC, the FCA
should pay a particular attention to how prominently and how often HCSTC lenders display
their text warning. By looking at a number of online lenders’ websites, one can easily see how
the lack of attention to this issue has already been exploited by some of the HCSTC lenders.
For example, Wonga, Satsuma and Quick Quid do not have the warning displayed in bold.16
Further, Wonga and Satsuma use a small size text for the warning and it is displayed on a
coloured background that makes it hardly visible.17
On the other hand, it can be suggested that there are other information provisions, than debt
warning and information on debt advice, which should be considered to empower consumers’
decision making abilities. This is something that the FCA alluded to in CP13/10 BDetailed
Proposal for the FCA Regime for Consumer Credit^ but does not seem to have followed
through so far. In its October 2013 consultation, the FCA referred to the need to conduct more
behavioural research into ways to Bnudge^ consumers to make better choices (FCA 2013, p.
78). The concept of a Bnudge^ was developed by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) in their seminal
book BNudge: ImprovingDecisions about Health,Wealth andHappiness.^ They define a nudge
as Bany aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way
without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as
a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid^ (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p.
6). Accordingly, it can be argued that information provisions can be developed to work as an
effective nudge. For instance, information can be framed in a way that reminds borrowers of the
cost of their current borrowing in the form of future spending that must be forgone in order to
pay their debt highlighting the significant trade-off. Also, when borrowing small amounts,
information can be used to minimise the Bpeanuts effect^where borrowers do not fully consider
15 This research was conducted regarding warnings and labels on cigarette packs see Bansal Travers, M.,
Hammond, D., & Cummings, K. M. (2011). The Impact of Cigarette Pack Design, Descriptors and Warning
Labels on Risk Perception in the U.S. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 40(6) 674–682.
16 Quick Quid, https://www.quickquid.co.uk/ accessed 22.03.16, Wonga, www.wonga.com accessed 22.03.16,
Satsuma, https://www.satsumaloans.co.uk/?ref=GO_AT&st=satsuma&kwcid=1&cmpid=paid_search-google-
brand_core_p-brand_core_p_core-satsumas&s_kwcid=AL!535!3!79250954943!p!!g!!satsuma&gclid=COHh39
y-3ccCFSMewwod3-MGVQ&ef_id=Us5r-wAAAemLvJsQ:20150904133142:s
17 Accessed 22.03.16.
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the results of small amount transactions (Bertrand and Morse 2011, p. 1873). This requires
showing borrowers the total amount that they would end up paying, including interest, fees and
charges, if they used the maximum two rollovers allowed by the FCA (FCA 2014b).
Further, information can be used to suggest a starting point for the thought or valuation
process of borrowers, which is known as Banchoring^ (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 26). This
means that when borrowers are applying for HCSTC, they should be asked to fill in the
previous amounts of HCSTC that they borrowed and the actual amounts they paid back. This
would subtly make these experiences the starting point of borrowers’ valuation process and an
integral part of their constructed narrative, which is the basis of their credit decision. Despite
suggestions that as part of the Bplanning fallacy^ problem, individuals tend to discount past
negative experiences (Buehler et al. 1997), it can be argued that reminding borrowers of past
experiences with a clear causal link with the present would make it difficult for them to
automatically discount the negative past. Research has found that the tendency to neglect
evidence contradicting the preferred answer, which in the case of borrowing is to say yes, can
be mitigated by making the evidence more salient (Koriat et al. 1980).
The positive effects of these suggestions may not be conclusive; however, their valid
underlying principles make them worth investigating more seriously in the context of HCSTC.
The Promotion of Social Credit Sources
It is important to note that the term Bsocial credit^ in this context refers to affordable credit that
is originated in the community or made available through the state welfare system, and it is
argued here that it is an essential means to protect those who are in desperate need of credit.
The lack of affordable alternatives that HCSTC consumers can resort to (i.e., Bsupply
vulnerability^) seems to be a neglected aspect of the HCSTC problem (Aldohni 2013). It is
suggested here that addressing this aspect is essential to embed the HCSTC market in the
society. Social credit sources, in this respect, are essential as they complement the protective
regulatory measures taken since the FCA became the regualtor in 2014, more specifically the
credit cost cap. The HCSTC industry argued that controlling the cost of credit would drive the
credit providers out of the market and force consumers to use Bmore expensive, less desirable
and possibly unregulated alternatives^ (Consumer Finance Association 2013; University of
Bristol, Personal Finance Research Centre 2013, p. 117–118). Social credit sources, accord-
ingly, play a vital role in mitigating this side effect provided it materialised.18 Therefore, it is
essential to facilitate the creation or the promotion of socially based credit sources. Unfortu-
nately, the UK has, arguably, not made a steady progress in this respect for the reasons
demonstrated below.
On the one hand, under the New Labour Government, the Department of Work and Pension
(DWP) was allocated a Growth Fund. The DWP Growth Fund was set up as a part of the
Government’s financial inclusion agenda (Mckillop et al. 2011). The primary aim of this fund
was to develop the capacity of third sector lenders, such as credit unions and Community
Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs), to serve deprived and excluded borrowers by provid-
ing access to affordable credit (typically between 12 and 28%APR) and help those lenders with the
cost of lending (Collard et al. 2010). Despite its success in extending credit to financially excluded
individuals in deprived communities and expanding the personal lending operations of credit
18 Although the Bristol University report (March 2013) was not in favour of price restrictions it suggested that
they can be imposed if other credit alternatives were available, p. 117–118.
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unions and CDFIs (Collard et al. 2010), the DWP Growth Fund ended in March 2011 as a part of
the austerity measures post 2010. With the absence of this funding, borrowers on low incomes
would be forced to use more expensive credit and resort to HCSTC providers.
In response, the Coalition Government found credit unions as Bthe only other realistic
option^ to serve low-income consumers (DWP 2012, p. 4). However, the current
organisational and business structure was found to be an obstacle and would need to be
modernised in order for them to stand as a sustainable, credible and effective source of finance
to individuals on low income. Therefore, the Government took a number of steps in this
respect.
First, the DWP launched in May 2012 the BDWP Credit Union Expansion Project^ the
feasibility study of which examined Bthe sustainability of credit unions^ and Bwhat more can
be done to expand them to serve many more people on lower incomes^ (DWP’s announce-
ment in the House of Commons, cited in Edmonds 2015, p. 30). In April 2013, the Govern-
ment awarded the Association of British Credit Unions Ltd. (ABCUL) the contract (worth £38
million) to deliver DWP’s Credit Union Expansion Project in order to modernise and grow
credit unions (DWP 2016). The project was planned to end in April 2016; however, a request
has been made for a further extension which is, at the time of writing this article, under
Government consideration (UK Parliament 2015). Given that the modernisation project is not
yet complete, it is difficult to assess its effectiveness. Nonetheless, it is fair to suggest that by
investing in credit unions, the government has taken an important step to promote the
infrastructure for embeddedness. This is due to the nature of credit unions as they are Bstrongly
embedded in their local communities and are committed to assisting those on low incomes^
and Boften appeal to low income consumers as bodies which are local, accessible and
convenient and which are community based^ (Sajid Javid, the then Economic Secretary to
the Treasury cited in Edmonds 2015, p. 34).
Second, as of 1st April 2014, the government introduced a statutory change to section 11
(5) of the Credit Union Act 1979 that allowed credit unions to charge interest up to 3% per
month—i.e., 42.6% APR (The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activi-
ties) (Amendment) (No.2) Order 2013(Art.06)); HM Treasury 2013, p. 12). This 1% increase
was specifically brought to ensure that credit unions do not make a loss when they lend short-
term small loans (up to £1000) which improves their ability to provide this type of credit and
compete with HCSTC lenders (HM Treasury 2012).
On the other hand, Social Funds, which the New Labour Government primarily made
available to people living on a low income with much needed lump sum payments and interest
free loans (Kempson et al. 2002), were abolished from April 2013. This meant that crisis loans,
which were also available to even those who were not on qualifying benefits, no longer exist.
Local authorities were asked to devise their own schemes to provide emergency assistance
(Rahilly 2011).
The government still offers budgeting loans where individuals on qualifying benefits can
use them to obtain interest-free loan to pay for essential things (furniture, clothes, moving costs
or hire purchase debts) with loan repayments being deducted directly from their benefits.19
It has been argued that Social Funds never had the capacity to deal with the increasing
demands (Collard 2007). However, instead of abolishing them, the Government should have
looked into new ways through which Social Funds capacity could have been improved. In this
regard, it has been suggested that Social Funds should be allowed to have initial interest-free
19 BBudgeting Loans^ https://www.gov.uk/budgeting-help-benefits/how-it-works.
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credit limit after which they can charge affordable interest rates (Collard and Kempson 2005).
This means an interest rate which is in line with the offering of other social lending facilities.
Additionally, devolving the system of emergency fund (crisis loans) to local authorities
does not really deal with the capacity problem. Rather, it shifts the problem to a less financially
able authority given the financial cuts faced by local councils and provides the residents of
poorer cities with less emergency financial assistance.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the business model of high-cost credit, more specifically HCSTC, has
evolved over the years. However, as demonstrated in part I, the vulnerability of its consumers
has remained a defining feature of the HCSTC market. Further, the new online platform of the
HCSTC business has widened the social groups that are exposed to the risks associated with
this type of credit.
Up until 2014, the regulator, under different consecutive UK governments, had failed to
take meaningful measures to protect the ever increasing numbers of HCSTC consumers. This
was not due to regulatory incompetence but rather due to a regulatory ideology that prioritised
the market over its bedrock that is society. The regulation that was in place only facilitated the
functioning of the market and enforced its laws namely supply and demand and pricing. For
instance, although the OFT, the former regulator, published irresponsible lending guidance, it
was effectively enforced.
Further, the court in applying the Bunfair relationship test^ paid particular attention to the
practice of the market regarding the interest rate. This is not to say that the court failed to
establish the link between unfairness and high interest rate. As demonstrated in Pelvin (2014),
the Supreme Court made the vulnerability of the consumers (discussed earlier in Part I) and the
availability of other credit options as important considerations in deciding on the fairness of the
credit agreement.
On the other hand, the recent implementation of a number of regulatory measures by the
FCA—capping the number of roll overs, enforcing the requirement of creditworthiness/
affordability assessment and capping the HCSTC price—has signified a departure from the
law and economics model of regulation towards a more socially anchored one, in which the
concept of Bembeddedness^ has a central role.
As argued earlier, Bembeddedness^ in this context encompasses the use of social organi-
sations in shaping economic behaviour and the implementation of socially concerned regula-
tion that goes beyond the interest of the market. Where a threshold level of embeddedness is
maintained in the market (Block 2003), the society can benefit from the presumed state
authority, through the introduction of socially concerned regulations that control individuals’
greed and limit their pursuit of gain (Watson 2005).
This is what these regulatory measures, in principle, are set to achieve. They are designed to
keep a viable business model for the HCSTC providers without jeopardising the protection of the
borrowers. It is also clear that the regulator is committed to ensuring the effectiveness of these
measures. At the time of writing this article, the FCA is reviewing one of its important measures,
namely HCSTC price cap, in order to assess whether there is a need to change this measure.
Further, the infrastructure of embeddedness in the context of HCSTC would require the use
of other social institutions such as knowledge and education. In this respect, the FCA has taken
certain steps since July 2014 to utilise the use of the information provisions to protect HCSTC
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consumers. In this regard, the FCA imposed the requirements for debt warnings and debt
advice to be displaced by the HCSTC providers.
However, the implementation format of these measures especially in relation to debt warnings
fell short. This significantly undermines their effectiveness in communicating the risks associated
with this type of credit. Therefore, the FCA should review how currently the debt warning
requirement is being implemented by HCSTC providers. This is essential to ensure that the warning
achieves its optimal effect and to prevent HCSTC providers from undermining the benefit of this
information provision. The FCA has yet to explore other information provisions that empower
borrowers to make a better valuation before taking on HCSTC. This is an area that is supported by a
large volume of behavioural literature; yet, it still needs to be utilised by the FCA in the context of
HCSTC.
Finally, the promotion of Bsocial credit sources^ was found to be an essential of part of the
embeddedness process for HCSTC market. In this regard, the Government efforts to modern-
isation and expansion of credit unions are a welcome step. Credit unions, as socially embedded
institutions, would help address the issue of credit supply vulnerability in their communities.
On the other hand, the cuts to the welfare state have not helped the promotion of Bsocial credit
sources.^ The abolition of Social Funds, in particular Bcrisis loans,^ is a setback to the quest of
promoting affordable credit to the most vulnerable. The government should have looked into
ways to make Social Funds less expensive for the government and more sustainable instead of
abolishing them and shifting this problem to local councils, especially in poor cities, which are
already faced with significant budget cuts.
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